Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown is visiting Beijing this week to sign a strategic partnership agreement with the world’s second-largest economy in the latest sign of China’s expanding influence in the Pacific Islands region.
But the proposed pact has shaken decades-old ties between the Cook Islands and New Zealand, neighbours that are set to mark 60 years of a free association agreement in 2025. That agreement has long given New Zealand influence over the Cook Islands, especially over its foreign policy.
With tensions mounting, we break down what the proposed deal between China and the Cook Islands is all about, why New Zealand is upset and what this means for the region.
What is the deal between the Cook Islands and China?
Brown is set to sign a Joint Action Plan for Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China during his February 10-14 trip.
Without elaborating on the plan, he has said the partnership would expand economic opportunities “while ensuring our sovereignty and national interests remain at the forefront”. He added that details “will be agreed upon” during his trip, which marks the first visit by a Cook Islands leader to China in a decade.
The deal is expected to revolve around trade cooperation, climate, tourism, and infrastructure.
Brown has emphasised that the deal does not involve security or defence matters.
But the United States and its allies in the region, including Australia and New Zealand, have been wary of China’s growing influence in the Pacific ever since Beijing signed a security agreement with the Solomon Islands in 2022. That agreement allows for Chinese police presence on the islands, ostensibly for training the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force, the closest the country has to an army.
Does China already have a presence on the Cook Islands?
China has been a key economic partner for the Cook Islands. According to the Sydney-based Lowy Institute think tank’s database, the Cook Islands spent $517m of foreign aid between 2008 and 2022.
New Zealand, with $219m, is the biggest contributor, but China, with $112m, is the second biggest source of the nation’s foreign assistance – more than twice Australia’s share. The US, meanwhile, has contributed only $95,000 to the Cook Islands over these 14 years.
In the past, China and New Zealand have partnered to jointly help the Cook Islands develop a major water supply project through a tripartite agreement – the first such deal that Beijing had ever struck.
Chinese financial assistance – along with aid from Australia and New Zealand – helped the Cook Islands host the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders’ Meeting in 2023, according to the Pacific nation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Immigration.
Last September, China and the Solomon Islands agreed to explore other projects – including the development of a multiuse transport hub in the Northern Cook Islands.
Are the Cook Islands truly autonomous of New Zealand?
The Cook Islands, a grouping of 15 islands and atolls in the South Pacific, became a British protectorate in 1888. New Zealand annexed the region in 1901 despite local opposition and remained in control until 1965 when the Cook Islands achieved self-governing status and entered a “free association” agreement with Wellington.
This arrangement allows the Cook Islands to manage their domestic and international affairs while relying on New Zealand for financial assistance and defence. Citizens of the Cook Islands hold New Zealand passports and are automatically New Zealand citizens. Additionally, nearly 100,000 people who identify as Cook Islands Maori live in New Zealand.
While the Cook Islands is technically free to engage in its international agreements, its “free association” agreement with New Zealand includes provisions for regular consultation on foreign policy, especially on security and strategic matters.
According to New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington has a constitutional obligation to respond to requests for assistance with foreign affairs, disasters and defence.
A spokesperson for New Zealand’s Foreign Ministry said it expected the Cook Islands government to fully consult Wellington on any significant agreements it planned to enter that could “have major strategic and security implications”.
Did tensions between New Zealand and the Cook Islands explode suddenly?
No, they had been building up.
With a population of 15,000, the Cook Islands introduced a proposal in December 2024 to establish its own passport system, although Brown said it would be more for identifying its citizens as Cook Islanders and “not to be used as a travel document or anything like that”.
However, New Zealand strongly opposed this move, warning that it could lead to full independence and the loss of automatic New Zealand citizenship for Cook Islanders. The proposal was ultimately withdrawn due to public and governmental pressure.
“New Zealand has bared its teeth,” Brown told Cook Islands News, a local publication, and had indicated that it was “willing to punish Cook Islanders” over the passport proposal.
“The passport has to be off. We’ll look at other ways to be able to recognise our own nationality as Cook Islanders,” he added.
How has New Zealand reacted to the China deal?
New Zealand has expressed concerns over the lack of transparency it says has surrounded the Cook Islands’ agreement with China, arguing that such major international deals should be discussed beforehand.
After Brown announced his trip, Winston Peters, New Zealand’s deputy prime minister, told radio station Newstalk ZB: “[This] has blindsided both the Cook Islands people and ourselves.”
Although Brown insists that the agreement is purely economic, New Zealand views it as an affront to the diplomatic arrangement of the two nations.
“First of all, a demand to have a separate passport, so to speak, which would be dramatic in terms of our constitutional arrangements, and also the coming visit to China,” said Peters, who is also New Zealand’s foreign minister, speaking to Newstalk ZB.
Is New Zealand locked in any other tensions in the region?
Yes, it is.
Last month, New Zealand officials said they were reconsidering all development aid to Kiribati after the abrupt cancellation of a planned meeting between New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters and Kiribati President Taneti Maamau.
New Zealand contributed $58m in development aid to Kiribati between 2021 and 2024, according to official figures.
“The lack of political-level contact makes it very difficult for us to agree joint priorities for our development programme, and to ensure that it is well targeted and delivers good value for money,” a statement from Peters’s office said. New Zealand will review all development cooperation with Kiribati as a result, it added.
Peters said he was informed that Maamau could not accommodate him just a week before the planned meeting.
Ruth Cross Kwansing, a member of parliament from Kiribati, denied her country attempted to snub New Zealand. In a Facebook post, she insisted that the cancellation of the meeting was due to changes in protocol.
“While New Zealand has every right to review its aid programme to Kiribati or any developing country, it is crucial that these kinds of decisions are based on genuine development processes and not used as a tool for political pressure,” she wrote on January 28.
Tensions have risen since Kiribati signed a series of bilateral deals with China in 2019. Kiribati also severed ties with pro-West Taiwan the same year as a growing number of Pacific island nations gravitate towards Beijing.
Why are the Cook Islands and other Pacific islands strategically significant?
The Cook Islands, along with 13 other small Pacific nations, excluding New Zealand and Australia, hold strategic value due to their geographic location. They host a population of less than 13 million but cover 15 percent of the planet’s surface.
Scattered over vast stretches of the Pacific Ocean, these islands are critical for maritime routes, military positioning, and geopolitical influence.
During World War II, the region was a battleground between Japan and the US, with airstrips and naval bases playing a key role in the Pacific theatre.
China’s engagement in the Pacific has largely focused on aid, investment, and infrastructure projects, including roads, schools, and clinics. But that assistance has grown dramatically, and after witnessing some cuts during COVID-19, has surged again – second only to Australia, and far ahead of New Zealand and the US.
Amid criticism that it is trapping smaller nations in debt traps through loans, China has also switched to offering more grants, according to data from the Lowy Institute.
What does this mean for the balance of power globally?
The proposed China-Cook Islands strategic deal comes amid growing competition for influence in the region between China on the one hand, and the US, Australia, and New Zealand on the other.
The Solomon Islands’ security agreement followed its 2019 decision to drop recognition of Taiwan and instead acknowledge Beijing as the sole legitimate government of China.
Similarly, Kiribati also switched diplomatic allegiance from Taiwan to China in 2019. Since then, China has funded various infrastructure projects in Kiribati, including road improvements and solar energy installations. In January 2020, Kiribati also joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
The US, meanwhile, has also tried to step up — setting up embassies in Kiribati, Tonga, the Cook Islands and Niue over the past two years.